The private provision mechanism is individually incentive compatible but inefficient. The Lindahl mechanism is efficient but not incentive compatible. We contrast the outcome of the manipulated Lindahl mechanism to the private provision equilibrium. When the demand announcements of participants are unrestricted the Lindahl mechanism suffers from multiple equilibria. If the government removes the multiplicity by restricting the functional form of announcements the resulting Lindahl equilibrium can be made approximately efficient. Approximate efficiency is achieved by announcements that are one-dimensional regardless of the number of participants in the mechanism. This is in contrast to mechanisms that achieve exact efficiency but require announcements whose dimensionality increases at the same rate as the number of participants. The mechanism we describe benefits from simplicity at the cost of approximate efficiency.
Introduction
The Lindahl mechanism was introduced to economics by Lindahl (1919) and first formalized by Johansen (1963) . The basis of the mechanism is that each participant announces a demand function for a public good with the cost share as the argument of the function. An equilibrium of the mechanism is a set of cost shares and a level of public good that simultaneously satisfy the demand functions and the need for the cost shares to sum to one. If all participants act honestly and announce demand functions that reflect preferences, the equilibrium is efficient: it selects a point from the "Samuelson set" of efficient allocations for the public good economy. Unfortunately, the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive compatible. By announcing a false demand function a participant in the mechanism can gain by increasing the share of the public good financed by other participants, even though this will reduce the quantity of public good in equilibrium. The private provision of a public good can be seen as an alternative allocation mechanism. In this mechanism the strategy of each participant is a level of contribution to the public good. The private provision mechanism is incentive compatible and, under standard assumptions, has a unique equilibrium Varian 1986, 1992) . However, the private provision equilibrium is not efficient and a simultaneous increase in provision by all participants is Pareto-improving.
These properties of the Lindahl and private provision mechanisms are all well-known and several surveys are available Sandler 1996, Myles 1995) . What is not clear in the literature are the properties of the equilibrium that arises if all participants in a Lindahl mechanism act strategically and, in particular, how the private provision mechanism performs relative to the manipulated Lindahl. Sertel and Sanver (1999) construct a set of conditions under which false announcement by all participants in the Lindahl mechanism leads to the private provision equilibrium. However, it is assumed that the government, who is the operator of the mechanism, knows the preferences of the participants and is uninformed only about endowments. What we wish to consider is the Lindahl mechanism when the government knows neither preferences nor endowments. We assume that all participants will attempt to manipulate the mechanism with freedom to choose from a general set of announcements. Our intention is to establish the existence of an equilibrium for this situation and to derive its properties, focussing in particular upon how it compares to the private provision equilibrium. We also wish to consider the role that government intervention can play in limiting manipulation when the government is uninformed.
Our motivation for pursuing this inquiry is that the Lindahl mechanism is an eminently practical method of determining public good provision. Since it relies only on the announcement of a demand function by each participant it is a simple and practical way of eliciting valuations and determining an equilibrium allocation. Its usefulness is amplified by that fact that it does not require any information on preferences or endowments. At the heart of our analysis is the question of whether we can retain any of these appealing properties and at the same time reduce the manipulation of the mechanism. Looking ahead, our main results show that by placing restrictions upon the demand functions that can be announced we can construct a simple mechanism that achieves an equilibrium allocation as close to efficiency as we wish. It should be noted at this point that the Lindahl mechanism (with honest revelation) decentralizes a single point of the Samuelson set of efficient allocations. This feature of the Lindahl mechanism is often overlooked in the literature. The mechanism we construct also approximately decentralizes a single point but this need not be the same point as for the Lindahl mechanism with honest revelation: both points are Pareto efficient but may differ in the cost share of the public good assigned to each participant. Although the equilibria are in the Samuelson set there may be nothing especially attractive about the distributional aspects of either allocation. What we do show in this respect is that, under certain conditions, the approximately efficient point Pareto-dominates the private provision equilibrium.
The paper contributes to the extensive literature on mechanisms for the decentralization of efficient equilibrium with public goods. Some of the most relevant contributions to this literature are now discussed. Bergstrom (1970) was among the first papers to provide a mechanism for efficient decentralization via a Lindahl-type mechanism. In the distributive Lindahl mechanism each participant announces a set of cost shares (for each good, for each participant) and prices are adjusted to achieve an equilibrium which is necessarily efficient. This mechanism has recently been generalized by Tian (2003) to ensure that it is safe from the formation of coalitions. Varian (1994) provides a compensation mechanism that decentralizes efficient equilibria. This mechanism involves each participant announcing a vector of Pigouvian taxes (equal in dimensionality to the number of participants). Each participant is then subjected to the taxes announced by other participants plus a side-payment based on the deviation of his Pigouvian taxes from those of the other players. In equilibrium participants have an incentive to announce the same Pigouvian taxes in order to minimize the side payment and these are the taxes that decentralize the efficient equilibrium. Anderlini and Siconolfi (2004) also construct a mechanism that decentralizes the set of efficient equilibria. The mechanism works as follows. The government announces a set of tax shares. Each consumer then announces the contribution they wish to make to the public good as an addition to that already announced by other consumers, plus a set of (non-negative) transfers of endowment they wish to make to other consumers. It is shown that this achieves an efficient outcome provided that there are at least three consumers. The restriction to three consumers is a consequence of the need to be able to construct Pareto-improvements that involve individually-rational redistribution (the same requirement appears in the analysis by Cornes and Sandler (2000) of Pareto-improvements in the private contribution model). Furthermore, the mechanism does not determine the tax shares nor generate the information necessary to derive these shares from welfare maximization. It should be noted that the strategy announced by participants in each of these mechanisms has dimensionality at least equal to the number of participants, and sometimes equal to the square of this number. As a consequence the strategies becomes increas-ingly complex (as measured by dimensionality) as the number of participants increases.
The basis of our approach is to begin with the Lindahlian concept of consumers announcing public good demand functions. It is known that the equilibrium of the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive-compatible so announced demands will not be true demands. What has not been clarified in the literature is the equilibrium that emerges when all participants in the Lindahl mechanism attempt to manipulate it by announcing false demands, or even whether an equilibrium exists in such a case. We prove that an equilibrium does exist, and use this fact as a starting point for analyzing how the Lindahl mechanism can be improved if the manipulation is taken into account. We show that by restricting the permissible functional form of the demand announcement it is possible to construct a mechanism in which each participant announces a single parameter and the resulting equilibrium is approximately efficient. We do not use approximately efficient here to mean that it approaches efficiency as population size becomes large, but instead to refer to the limit as a parameter in the announced demand tends to a specific value. The important feature of the mechanism is that each participant makes a one-dimensional announcement regardless of the size of the population. This should be contrasted to the mechanisms described above where the dimensionality of the announcement is at least equal to population size. For our mechanism the announcement is no more complex in a large population than it is in a small population.
The practical value of the mechanism is that the announcement is no more that the statement of a demand for the public good as a function of the tax share. Hence, we remain entirely true to the concept of the original Lindahl mechanism and can elicit the information with a single question that can be easily implemented. Compared to other mechanisms in the literature we obtain simplicity at the cost of approximate efficiency.
The second section of the paper introduces the notation and briefly describes the private provision model and the Lindahl mechanism. Section 3 presents the general results on the existence and multiplicity of equilibrium with general demand announcements in the Lindahl mechanism. The consequences of using parametric representation of possible announcements are considered in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 demonstrates how approximate efficiency can be achieved for mechanisms with linear and hyperbolic announcements respectively. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
Equilibrium provision
The economy we analyze has a single private good and a single public good. Production of both goods is subject to constant returns to scale. The units of measurement are chosen so that the price of both goods is constant at 1. We call the agents that are involved in the allocation mechanisms participants. This neutral terminology is chosen to capture the fact that the participants can be consumers, firms, or even countries. There are H participants indexed h = 1, ..., H. The income of participant h is fixed at M h ≥ 0. Participant h has preferences represented by the utility function
where x h is the consumption of the private good and G the total quantity of public good. In their analysis of private provision Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) place restrictions upon the choices arising from (1). The conditions of Assumption 1 can be shown to be sufficient to imply the restrictions of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian.
Assumption 1 The utility function is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies:
Private provision mechanism
In the private provision mechanism participant h makes a contribution g h ≥ 0 to the public good and G = H h=1 g h . If g h > 0 participant h is termed a contributor and is a non-contributor if g h = 0. The contribution towards the public good by all participants other than h, G h , is defined by
Using the budget constraint x h + g h = M h , utility can be written in terms of
Participant h chooses g h to maximize (3) given G h and subject to
The Nash reaction function can be written as
The equilibrium of the private provision mechanism occurs at a set of choices for the participants such that all the reaction functions are simultaneously satisfied.
Definition 1 A private provision equilibrium is an array of contributions
The proof that such an equilibrium exists employs the standard argument for demonstrating the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Assuming that preferences are strictly convex, the composite function
.., g H ) has at least one fixed point and a fixed point of R (g 1 , ..., g H ) is clearly a private provision equilibrium. Employing (ii) of Assumption 1 establishes that the private provision equilibrium is also unique. Given a value of G h , the contribution by h can be written as a function of income, g h = f h (M h ). Varian (1986, 1992) show that a sufficient condition for uniqueness is 0 < ∂fh(Mh) ∂Mh < 1. This restriction requires both private and public goods to be normal and is implied by Assumption 1.
The private provision mechanism is also an aggregative game (Cornes and Hartley, 2004 ). Since we use this result below we state it formally.
Lemma 1 The private provision mechanism is an aggregative game: the equilibrium is dependent on the sum of incomes and is invariant to income redistributions that do not change the set of contributors.
Lindahl mechanism
The Lindahl mechanism requires that each participant announce a demand function for the public good. Denote by τ h , 0 ≤ τ h ≤ 1, the share of cost of the public good paid by h. If a quantity G of the public good is provided the budget constraint of h is
The Lindahl demand function of h is denoted
A Lindahl equilibrium given a set of announced demand functions can now be defined. The Lindahl equilibrium can be shown to exist under weak assumptions upon the Lindahl demand functions. We give such a proof in the next section.
Definition 2 A Lindahl equilibrium given a set of announced demand functions {ϕ 1 (τ 1 ) , ..., ϕ H (τ H )} is an array of shares and a level of public good,
with complementary slackness and
The announced Lindahl demand function is the true Lindahl demand function (participants act honestly) if for all
When all participants announce true Lindahl demand functions the equilibrium of the mechanism is efficient. Ignoring corner solutions for simplicity a demonstration follows by observing that the necessary condition for the maximization in (6) is
Samuelson set
Figure 1: Lindahl equilibrium with true demands Summing over participants gives
This is the Samuelson rule for the economy and completes the demonstration that the Lindahl equilibrium with honest announcement is Pareto efficient. The efficiency of the Lindahl mechanism with honest announcement is shown in figure 1. The true Lindahl demand functions are the loci of the vertical points on the indifference curves and the equilibrium is found at their intersection. At this point, the indifference curves for the two participants are tangential and the equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Note for later reference that the Samuelson set is given by the dashed locus of tangency points.
It is well known that the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive compatible. By announcing a demand function that differs from the true demand function a participant in the mechanism can beneficially modify the outcome. This is shown in figure 2 where it is assumed that participant 1 acts honestly and participant 2 knows the demand announcement of 1. Honesty on the part of participant 2 would lead to the equilibrium e L . However, by announcing a false demand function the equilibrium can be driven to point e M which represents the maximization of 2's utility given the Lindahl demand function of 1.
Examples
The case of logarithmic utility provides a simple illustration of these results and is helpful for later use. Assume that there are two participants in the
Figure 2: Incentive incompatibility mechanism, h = 1, 2, with incomes M h . The utility function of participant h is
The necessary conditions for choice in the private provision mechanism are
which solve to give the equilibrium provision levels and total quantity of public good
Define the social welfare function
where µ 1 + µ 2 = 1, µ h ≥ 0. The Samuelson set is defined by the allocations {x 1 , x 2 , G} that maximize W as µ 1 ranges over the interval [0, 1] . For a given µ 1 the efficient allocation is
Contrasting (11) and (13) shows immediately the inefficiency of private provision.
The true Lindahl demand function with honest announcement is obtained from max
so
The Lindahl equilibrium honest announcement is achieved when
Contrasting (13) and (16) it can be seen that the Lindahl equilibrium corresponds to the point in the Samuelson set generated by the welfare weights
A tangency of the indifference curves of the participants defined over public good and cost shares occurs when
Solving this equation
for all τ 1 ∈ [0, 1], demonstrating that the allocations as τ 1 ranges over the set [0, 1] coincide with the Samuelson set.
Finally, if participant 1 announces the true demand function
The optimal share isτ
This share implies the equilibrium quantity of public goodĜ = 2M2+M1 4 which is clearly less than the equilibrium value with honest announcement. It can be achieved by any announcement of participant 2 that passes through the point τ 2 ,Ĝ .
Announcement equilibrium
The observation that the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive compatible raises questions about the equilibrium that emerges if all participants strategically choose false announcements. The example of the previous section has shown that if one participant is strategic the equilibrium level of public good is reduced relative to the level with honest announcement. It might be thought that strategic behavior by all participants will drive the level of public good even lower. Surprisingly, this issue does not seem to have been addressed in the existing literature.
Each participant i, i = 1, ..., H, in the mechanism announces a Lindahl demand function ϕ i (τ i ) where τ i , 0 ≤ τ i ≤ 1, is the Lindahl share of i in the cost of the public good. We impose the following assumption upon the announced demand function.
Assumption 2 For all
Relaxing restriction (ii) to allow weakly decreasing demand would not be too difficult but would require some of the results to be modified. We denote the set of demand functions satisfying Assumption 2 by Φ, and a set of announcements
We have introduced the concept of a Lindahl share for each participant. The requirement that these shares are consistent with the allocation of the full cost of the public good between participants is captured in Definition 3.
Given demand announcements ϕ the resulting set of Lindahl shares is a solution (if one exists) to the system
where the inequalities hold with complementary slackness. At a solution to (21) the level of public good is determined as G = ϕ k (τ k ) for some k with τ k > 0, and we write G = Γ (ϕ) .
The first result proves the existence of a vector of Lindahl shares for any set of announcements.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2 there exists a unique vector of Lindahl shares satisfying (21).
Proof. Define the function
The function V is a continuous function of the τ i and therefore has a minimum on the simplex which is a compact set. Since all the terms in the sum are nonnegative the minimum value that V can achieve is zero. The proof establishes that V will always achieve the minimum of 0 on the simplex given (i) and (ii) of Assumption 2.
Assume that for some set of announcements, ϕ, V is minimized by {τ * } and that the minimized value V * > 0. For V * > 0 it must be the case that there are some i for which max ϕ j τ * j
is greatest (if this is not uniquely identified the argument extends by selecting all) and denote thish. In addition select the subset K of H for which max ϕ j τ * j
. Index the members of this set by k = 1, ...,Ĥ.
Now define a new set of shares {τ }. Letτh = τ * h − ε and for those in K let
Because of the continuity of ϕ j the values of ε k can be selected to ensure that
Define ∆ϕh = ϕh τ * h − ϕh τh and
By (ii) of Assumption 2 we have ∆ϕh < 0 and ∆ϕ k > 0.
LetṼ denote the value of V at {τ }. Then observe
Since V * −Ṽ > 0 the choice {τ * } could not be minimizing. Hence the minimized value is 0 and the equation system has a solution. The strict monotonicity implies that this solution is unique.
Denote the set of announcements ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ i−1 , ϕ i+1 , ..., ϕ H by ϕ −i . An announcement equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 4 An announcement equilibrium is a set of announcementsφ ∈ Φ H and a vector of Lindahl sharesτ satisfying (21) givenφ such that:
With these definitions is now possible to prove the existence of an announcement equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists an announcement equilibrium.
Proof. Under Assumption 1 we know that a unique equilibrium exists for the private provision mechanism. Assume initially that the provision g h of each participant is strictly positive at this equilibrium. The latter part of the argument will relax this assumption. The proof shows that the private provision equilibrium can be supported as an announcement equilibrium. This establishes that the announcement equilibrium exists.
Since g h > 0 at the private provision equilibrium it follows that the necessary condition for choice of individual contribution
is satisfied. The first step is to derive the point in the Lindahl space of cost shares and public good quantity that corresponds to the private provision equilibrium. At the private provision equilibrium the utility achieved by h is
which is equivalent to the Lindahl equilibrium with cost share
and public good level
Assume all participants other than h have made linear announcements, 
Solving these equations successively
Recursively substituting for h = 1, ..., H − 1, using the fact that the shares must sum to 1, solving for τ H then substituting into the announcement of H shows that given the announcements ϕ −1 , h can select the equilibrium from the locus
The same construction holds for all h = 1, ..., H.
A necessary condition for the private provision equilibrium to be supported by the announcements is that the gradient of the locus is equal to the gradient of the indifference curve of participant h at point {τ h , G} . The gradient of the indifference curve is
where the inequality is a consequence of τ h < 1. It is therefore necessary to prove that there is a solution with b i > 0 to the equation system
Solving the system gives
At the private provision equilibrium
.
where the inequality follows from the fact that τ i < 1. Hence there is a strictly positive solution. The Lindahl equilibrium corresponding to the private provision equilibrium has
Given these values for b h the values of a h , h = 1, ..., H, can then be chosen to ensure that the announcements satisfy
which is sufficient for the announcements to support the private provision equilibrium. Hence
must be satisfied when evaluated at the private provision equilibrium {g h }. Consider now a private provision equilibrium where the contribution is 0 for some participants. Partition the set of participants into the set H 1 for whom g h > 0 and the set H 2 for whom g h = 0. Apply the argument given above to support the choices of the participants in set H 1 . The intersection of their announcements determines the locus of potential allocations facing each participant in the set H 2 given that all other in the set choose g h = 0. Since non-contribution was privately optimal for set H 2 in the private provision equilibrium, it will remain so in the announcement equilibrium. Therefore assign an announcement to each member of the set H 2 that intersects the locus of potential allocations at G < 0. This results in the cost shares being 0 for all h ∈ H 2 which is an equilibrium outcome.
The argument of Theorem 1 shows that a set of equilibrium announcements exist which support the private provision equilibrium as an announcement equilibrium. Reviewing the argument it can be seen that the properties of the private provision equilibrium were only used to simplify the equation system that was to be solved. The assumed continuity shows that the equation system must also have a strictly positive solution in some neighborhood of the private provision equilibrium. Therefore, there must be other allocations which can be supported as announcement equilibria. When there are only two consumers this fact is easily demonstrated. Consider figure 3. Select a point such as a 1 where two indifference curves cross with positive gradient. Then add a linear announcement for participant 1 which is tangential to the indifference curve of participant 2, and a linear announcement for participant 2 which is tangential to the indifference curve of participant 1. The same construction can also be applied to derive announcements that support a 2 as an equilibrium. These announcements constitute an equilibrium since neither participant has an incentive to deviate. These observations lead to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The Lindahl mechanism has multiple announcement equilibria.
This non-uniqueness of announcements when participants are strategic was observed in a related context by Varian (1994) . In fact, it is possible to support any allocation where the indifference curves have positive gradient, which for some forms of preferences will be the entire set of allocations below the Samuelson locus in the Lindahl allocation space. Once we allow the participants freedom to make strategic announcements the model is unable to provide a prediction upon the equilibrium allocation.
Parametric announcements
The proof of existence for an announcement equilibrium involved supporting a chosen allocation by linear announcements. The next result demonstrates that the use of linear announcements is a general route to a simplified analysis of the equilibrium. Any equilibrium in announcements that satisfy Assumptions 2 can be achieved by announcements which are linear. For simplicity it is assumed that all shares are positive in equilibrium. The proof can be extended in the same manner as that of Theorem 1 to accommodate participants with zero shares.
Lemma 3 (i) Ifφ is a set of equilibrium announcements for the manipulated Lindahl mechanism, then â i −b i τ i is also a set of equilibrium announcements
then there existsφ i ∈ Φ H such thatφ is a set of equilibrium announcements.
Proof. (i) Assumption 2 restricts the announcement ϕ i to be strictly decreasing in τ i . Hence the equilibrium must be unique and occurs at the point ϕ i (τ i ) =φ j (τ j ) . By definition, the linear announcementsâ i −b i τ i , i = 1, ..., H, must also have a unique intersection at {τ i }. By definition no participant will wish to deviate from the equilibrium with announcements {φ i (τ i )} and the equalityb i =φ i (τ i ) guarantees that this is also true for the linear announcements. (ii) This is obvious since the given linear function satisfies Assumption 2 and is a member of the set of possible announcements.
The implication of this result is that the search for equilibrium in terms of announcements satisfying Assumption 2 can be replaced by a search among the subset of linear announcements without altering the set of equilibria. All that is important is the point of intersection of the announcements, and the gradient of the announcements at the point of intersection.
However, there still remains the problem of multiplicity. We need to be careful to check that the replacement of general announcements by linear announcements has not reduced the set of allocations that can be supported. For instance, if the optimization of utility over the choice of linear announcements resulted in a unique choice for each participant then the multiplicity of equilibria would have been removed and linear announcement would be more restrictive then general announcements. This will not occur if the optimization over linear announcements does not uniquely determine the two parameters of the linear announcement for each participant. The next result addresses this question.
To see what can be identified assume that the announcement of participant i is a function defined by a vector of n parameters (for instance a non-degenerate polynomial of degree n). Let this function be denoted f (τ i ; c i1 , ..., c in ) so that participant i announces c i = (c i1 , ..., c in ). Assume that there is no redundancy so f c ik = 0. For any set of announcements from the participants the shares solve
for some C and
Since the announcements are strictly decreasing in τ i the implicit function theorem applies and
The level of public good is
The choice problem for participant i is then
Lemma 4 The optimization problem can determine at most one parameter in each vector c i .
Proof. Observe that
Hence, the necessary condition for c ik in the optimization (27) is
which can be written as
This condition does not depend on k so there is a single independent necessary condition and the optimization can determine at most one parameter of the announcement for all k = 1, ..., n. The conclusion of this section is that the general announcements can be replaced by linear announcements. However, the problem of non-uniqueness still arises. The necessary conditions for the choice of parametrized announcement do not uniquely determine the parameters of the linear announcement. In fact, at most one parameter of any parametrized announcement can be found. This reflects the multiplicity of equilibria but causes problems for the mechanism without government intervention. One positive aspect is that the path is opened for the government to modify the mechanism by restricting one or more parameters of the announcement in order to enhance the efficiency of the equilibrium.
Intervention with linear announcements
This section analyzes what can be achieved by a government that intervenes within the mechanism. The idea is that we have seen that the announcement equilibrium is not unique. Using Lemma 4 we can see that if the government limits permissible announcements to a one-parameter class it can ensure a unique equilibrium. The question is whether the monoparametric class can be chosen to ensure a good outcome.
Fixed slope
The potential for intervention can be illustrated by assuming that there are just two participants in the mechanism. The government restricts announcements to be linear with a fixed slope, b. The announcement of each participant i must then be of the form ϕ i (τ i ) = a i − bτ i , so the intercept, a i , becomes the choice variable. Given a pair of announcements from the two participants it follows that the equilibrium will be
Using this information participant i solves
The necessary condition implies
Summing these conditions
Hence, in equilibrium G > 0 if and only if
Clearly, this allocation does not satisfy the Samuelson rule. The interesting question is what can be achieved by selecting the value of b. The answer to this question is suggested by the following example.
Example 1 Assume that utility is logarithmic. In the case of identical participants the equilibrium value of a is
and the resulting level of public good is
where O 1 b j denotes terms of order 1 b j . Hence, in the limit as b → ∞, the quantity of public good converges to the efficient level G = M.
The examples shows that letting b → ∞ generates the efficient level of public good in the limit. Therefore approximate efficiency can be achieved for large but finite b. It is now shown that this is a general result when the following additional assumption is imposed upon preferences.
Assumption 3 The utility function satisfies
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 3 the equilibrium with choice of intercept is approximately efficient for large b.
Proof. The choice of a h is defined by
where in equilibrium
The first-order condition for choice of a h is
Taking the sum of the first-order conditions for all participants, and noting that the shares must sum to one, we obtain
Under Assumption 3 it is never possible to have a zero public good in equilibrium. Also, because the number of participants is finite and their incomes are bounded, the quantity of public good is finite. Hence, for every b > 0, in equilibrium 0 < G < ∞. Now let b grow large. For G to remain finite it must be the case that
Hence, it follows that
Therefore, for large b the equilibrium becomes approximately efficient. This result shows that by restricting the functional form of permissible announcements it is possible for the government to engineer the mechanism to achieve approximate efficiency.
Fixed intercept
Fixing the gradient of the announcement is not the only method of securing approximate efficiency. The following example with two participants shows that is can also be achieved by fixing the intercept and allowing participants to announce a gradient.
Example 2 For square root utility the first-order condition for the choice of b 1 yields
With identical participants this becomes
This is a cubic equation for b, given a, which can be written as
With finite M, the right-hand side converges to zero as a grows large. Then it has to be the case that the left-hand side also converges to zero, which can only happen if the term in the brackets converges to zero. Therefore, as a grows large, b/a converges to 2, and the quantity of public good
converges to the efficient level 4M/3.
That the attainment of approximate efficiency is a general result is demonstrated in the next theorem.
Theorem 3 Under Assumption 3 the equilibrium with choice of intercept is approximately efficient for large a.
Proof. Given a value of a the choice of b h for participant h is defined by
It is convenient to write the first-order condition with respect to 1 b h :
In equilibrium
Using these derivatives the necessary condition can be rewritten as
Taking the sum over all participants,
Since in equilibrium 0 < G < ∞ for every a, it must be the case that
This, in its turn, implies
Therefore as a grows large the equilibrium becomes approximately efficient.
Observations
Theorems 2 and 3 show that the government can affect the announcement equilibrium by restricting the form of announcement that is permissible. By insisting the announcements are linear, and by setting either the gradient or the intercept of the announcement, it is possible to achieve approximate efficiency. Linear announcements are not the only functional form that can achieve approximate efficiency and the next section introduces an alternative form that has some appealing features.
Hyperbolic announcements
This section shows that the restriction to hyperbolic demand functions can also be used to obtain approximate efficiency. These announcements retain the feature of the linear case that the message is one-dimensional regardless of the number of participants in the mechanism.
Approximate efficiency
The choice of an announcement can be expressed in a different form to motivate the construction. Assume there are two participants in the mechanism and that one of these has made an announcement. The other participant chooses the point on the announcement that maximizes utility. Hence, taking ϕ 2 (τ 2 ) as given, participant 1 solves
This optimization generates the first-order condition
Similarly, for participant 2
The simultaneous solution to (34) and (35) determines an announcement equilibrium.
The basis of the approximate efficiency result is built on the next theorem which relates the announcement equilibrium and the private provision equilibrium.
Lemma 5 The announcement equilibrium coincides with the private provision equilibrium if the only permissible announcements are of the hyperbolic form
Proof. The private provision equilibrium is described by
Using the necessary condition (34) with the change of variable τ = 1 − z this will be achieved if
Solving the implied differential equation
The constants of integration, C i , i = 1, 2, become the choice variables for the participants. To see this note that at equilibrium we have
The optimization facing participant i is then
which is precisely the objective function when C i is the level of contribution at the private provision equilibrium. Lemma 5 implies that if the participants are required to announce the constant C i in a hyperbolic demand function then the private provision equilibrium is achieved. The attainment of the private provision equilibrium through announcement of hyperbolic demands is interesting but does not provide a case in favor of using such announcements to allocate the public good. Instead, it suggests that private provision should be employed as a simpler mechanism that requires no government intervention. However, the next example suggests that a modification of hyperbolic announcement can improve upon the private provision equilibrium.
Example 3 Assume utility is logarithmic and consider the consequence of an announcement of the form G = C h τ h −ξ . We can solve for any ξ to find that the equilibrium announcements are
At ξ = 0 this is the private provision equilibrium. Now consider the effect of increasing ξ. The equilibrium level of utility is
Hence
which is positive for all ξ ∈ 0, . If all participants have identical preferences the argument of the example must apply generally for the following reason: We know that the private provision mechanism is an aggregative game. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is dependent on the sum of incomes (as it was in the calculations of the example). Therefore, the attainment of a Pareto improvement starting from ξ = 0 does not depend upon the distribution of income. Hence, a Pareto improvement must be obtained. The continuation of the improvement to a point in the Samuelson set is not necessarily possible since the distribution of welfare at the starting point and the finishing point may be very different. However, it can be shown that the example does extend to the case of participants with identical preferences.
Lemma 6 Let all participants have identical preferences. For any ξ ∈ 0, 1 H an increase in ξ generates a Pareto improvement.
Proof. The demand announcement of h is given by 
Coalition proofness
The analysis so far has looked at the strategic incentives of individual participants. It is also possible for coalitions to deviate. The mechanism must be tested to see whether it is safe from manipulation by coalitions. The importance of coalition proofness has been stressed by Bernheim et al. (1987) . However, their recursive concept of coalition-proofness is not straightforward to apply. Instead we investigate whether the announcement equilibrium meets the strong Nash equilibrium criterion of Aumann (1959) . An equilibrium is strong Nash if no coalition can profitably deviate taking as given the choices of the participants who are not in the coalition.
Suppose that the first m < H participants form a coalition. Assume that the coalition's welfare function is the weighted sum of utilities of its members with the sum of weights can be normalized to unity. In this case the coalition solves max {C1,...,Cm} 
In the limit, as ξ → 1 H , the second term disappears and the solution converges to the non-cooperative outcome. Hence, possible gains from forming a coalition converge to zero and the mechanism has a strong Nash equilibrium.
Conclusions
The Lindahl mechanism promises much as a means of determining what quantity of a public good should be supplied and how the cost should be distributed. This promise is undermined by the strategic behavior of participants in the mechanism since making a false announcement of preferences is individually rational. This manipulation can damage the functioning of the mechanism to such an extent that it may be dominated by the inefficient mechanism of private provision.
We model this cheating of the mechanism as the announcement of a demand function for the public good. We have shown that equilibrium sets of announcements do exist and that the equilibrium is not unique. In fact, there is an uncountable infinity of equilibria. The non-uniqueness is reflected in the fact that in a parametrized version of the announcement the first-order conditions for choice can determine at most a single parameter. This lead into the idea of a mechanism where the permissible structure of the demand announcement is restricted by the operator of the mechanism. When the demand announcements must be linear fixing either the slope or the intercept of the announcements allows approximate efficiency to be achieved. It was also shown that approximate efficiency could be achieved with modified hyperbolic demand announcement and the participants could be brought arbitrarily close to the efficient equilibrium with equal shares.
The value of these results is to show how it is possible to move close to efficiency with no information on preferences or incomes and, in the limit, to obtain an equilibrium for the mechanism that is in the Samuelson set. It is also important to stress that the announcements required to obtain approximate efficiency are one-dimensional regardless of the number of participants. This needs to be contrasted to mechanisms that can achieve exact efficiency but use messages with dimensionality at least as great as the number of participants (and sometimes greater). The limitation of our mechanism is the we can decentralize only a single point in the Samuelson set.
Our analysis has remained true to the spirit of the Lindahl mechanism as the announcement of public good demand and the equilibrium through adjustment of cost shares. What we have shown is that judicious restrictions on the forms of demand announcements can overcome the consequences of manipulation. The mechanism trades simplicity for approximate efficiency, with the simplicity suggesting that it is possible to envisage this mechanism being employable in practice.
